For a moment, assume that assiduity cannot assuage the reflex of struggle, because struggle would otherwise be adulterated. There is a sense that struggle and assiduity are conjoined and perhaps often indiscriminate. Subsequent to the outcome of assiduity, we find struggle has great influence. The struggle of any additional assiduity cannot withstand counterpoint of assiduity's own redress.
The reward of this propitiation is not assiduity at all, but only struggle's own mitigation of itself. We see this many ways. A tiger, affronted by his stripe, is unable to find struggle. The tiger finds struggle only as his stripe finds assiduity. There are many such examples.
Whatever else, we infer struggle to be regular with respect to assiduity. What is the probability that assiduity is often resolved into struggle? An answer to this question is forthcoming. What of assiduity's tendencies towards the motives presumed by struggle? It is a contradictory presumption, at best. We cannot foresake intellect.
In summary, unsuspected enlightenment is achieved. An allotment of struggle's consignment is rarely discriminatory or apportioned. (Don't give up just yet.) And so: there can be no other fact, given the irrefutability of struggle, that struggle is often placated by assiduity.
ZEN Generator
Saturday, July 1, 2006
Thursday, June 29, 2006
Why Acrimony Does Not Imply Failure
There is tacit understanding of acrimony being an intercession of failure, in the course of failure's permissiveness. The conciliation of acrimony is not merely necessary to acrimony's moderation, but rather an actual mitigation of acrimony in repose to failure. What we take to be failure's significance is merely an impending of acrimony. Without contradiction, the value of acrimony with respect to failure is not in the measurement of failure's worth, but in acrimony's frequency of occurrence.
Today, I suddenly realize a new truth while teaching my students. When does failure find itself in collision with acrimony? We see how failure, and its invariant tendencies, can be ignored. Given that revelation, I am content that I have managed to dispose of failure's mysteries!
Yet, if this is true, acrimony has no implication over failure. Is it ever true that failure has no acrimony? How conspicuous is the answer! Intuitively we realize that failure must influence and govern the natural course of acrimony's function. When obliged by forbearance, we respond.
Sabriel, who is always ready to speak without thinking, does not disappoint me. If we consider acrimony without failure, then failure's irrelevance is quickly disputed. How does failure engage with acrimony? (She tries to understand, but is unfamiliar with acrimony. She will learn, in time.)
So we can clearly see the result of all of this. Any stylistic interpretation of acrimony (without recompense to failure) is not possible. (Yes, given time :-) Therefore: so it seems, acrimony is just the imperative of failure's function, and probably its disposition as well.
Today, I suddenly realize a new truth while teaching my students. When does failure find itself in collision with acrimony? We see how failure, and its invariant tendencies, can be ignored. Given that revelation, I am content that I have managed to dispose of failure's mysteries!
Yet, if this is true, acrimony has no implication over failure. Is it ever true that failure has no acrimony? How conspicuous is the answer! Intuitively we realize that failure must influence and govern the natural course of acrimony's function. When obliged by forbearance, we respond.
Sabriel, who is always ready to speak without thinking, does not disappoint me. If we consider acrimony without failure, then failure's irrelevance is quickly disputed. How does failure engage with acrimony? (She tries to understand, but is unfamiliar with acrimony. She will learn, in time.)
So we can clearly see the result of all of this. Any stylistic interpretation of acrimony (without recompense to failure) is not possible. (Yes, given time :-) Therefore: so it seems, acrimony is just the imperative of failure's function, and probably its disposition as well.
Monday, June 26, 2006
Deeper Deliberation On Bliss And Disrespect
Further explanation of my previous treatise appears necessary. On review, I observe I've not yet exposed the full significance of bliss with regard to disrespect, and I find the need to clarify my previous discussion.
Surmising that bliss cannot withstand disrespect in its predominance, we conclude the following: without disrespect, there is no bliss for perceiving causal outcome. If bliss is regarded in the context of disrespect, that regard indicates a basic incompatibility between disrespect and bliss. There is no conflict between bliss and disrespect, at the point of bliss's closure.
I am enlightened this morning, while in the library. Although bliss is non-quantitative with respect to disrespect's content, we know that bliss is combinatorial. Isn't it usually true that disrespect is a support for bliss's own relevance? I consider this sense of bliss's meaning to be very special!
Yet, we contrive bliss to be a part of disrespect, for that gives us an affectation that both exhilarates and inhibits us. When does bliss find itself in collision with disrespect? This question requires thought. For example, we find disrespect a normative condition for bliss's reference. We react to this discernment.
Sabriel, my apprentice, is confused by this. We cannot assume much more about bliss in a state of disrespect. How does bliss find itself in collision with disrespect? She is completely ignorant. She shows me disrespect, yet defies bliss with her endless and annoying questions!
We take discernment as a guide to truth. Often, the disclosure of bliss causes an admission of disrespect. Such is disrespect's customary exposition. (Strange hmmm?) For it must be that disrespect and bliss are simply aspects of a larger presumption.
Surmising that bliss cannot withstand disrespect in its predominance, we conclude the following: without disrespect, there is no bliss for perceiving causal outcome. If bliss is regarded in the context of disrespect, that regard indicates a basic incompatibility between disrespect and bliss. There is no conflict between bliss and disrespect, at the point of bliss's closure.
I am enlightened this morning, while in the library. Although bliss is non-quantitative with respect to disrespect's content, we know that bliss is combinatorial. Isn't it usually true that disrespect is a support for bliss's own relevance? I consider this sense of bliss's meaning to be very special!
Yet, we contrive bliss to be a part of disrespect, for that gives us an affectation that both exhilarates and inhibits us. When does bliss find itself in collision with disrespect? This question requires thought. For example, we find disrespect a normative condition for bliss's reference. We react to this discernment.
Sabriel, my apprentice, is confused by this. We cannot assume much more about bliss in a state of disrespect. How does bliss find itself in collision with disrespect? She is completely ignorant. She shows me disrespect, yet defies bliss with her endless and annoying questions!
We take discernment as a guide to truth. Often, the disclosure of bliss causes an admission of disrespect. Such is disrespect's customary exposition. (Strange hmmm?) For it must be that disrespect and bliss are simply aspects of a larger presumption.
Sunday, June 25, 2006
Why Piety Does Not Imply Willfulness
If willfulness is an example of piety, we perceive the following to be true: if piety's expectations are engaged, then willfulness is exhalted. No quality of willfulness is temperament to the status of piety. By extension, piety is an instance of willfulness's application. It is a case of dialectical materialism to assume otherwise.
If that is not true, then piety cannot be inferred from willfulness. Under what conditions does willfulness find collision with piety? It is an intriguing question. Assume this: in contrast: piety cannot objectify any portion of willfulness. It is willfulness's relationship with the world that gives it meaning.
My thoughtful apprentice, Sabriel, voices her opinion. Is it ever true that willfulness has no piety? Propriety of piety unconditionally yields willfulness. That follows from the general case of superposition, and its consequences. (Her modesty is frequently displayed.)
To wrap-up our discussion, we realize a singular thing. The affiance of piety leads to the transcendence of willfulness's various intentions. And so we have it. We realize: sameness of piety is willfulness in its variant determination. Through contemplation, that becomes obvious.
If that is not true, then piety cannot be inferred from willfulness. Under what conditions does willfulness find collision with piety? It is an intriguing question. Assume this: in contrast: piety cannot objectify any portion of willfulness. It is willfulness's relationship with the world that gives it meaning.
My thoughtful apprentice, Sabriel, voices her opinion. Is it ever true that willfulness has no piety? Propriety of piety unconditionally yields willfulness. That follows from the general case of superposition, and its consequences. (Her modesty is frequently displayed.)
To wrap-up our discussion, we realize a singular thing. The affiance of piety leads to the transcendence of willfulness's various intentions. And so we have it. We realize: sameness of piety is willfulness in its variant determination. Through contemplation, that becomes obvious.
Saturday, June 24, 2006
Our Cultivation, Counterposed With Our Resoluteness
Consider that what cultivation imposes on resoluteness is merely a disposition of resoluteness imposition on cultivation. Regardless of the cultivation of resoluteness, there is resoluteness in the essence of cultivation. And there is no knowledge beyond that. What type of cultivation best defines resoluteness? Or is cultivation even a consideration? No statement can be made with regard to resoluteness's sincerity in any matter of cultivation's provability and acceptance.
Today, while waiting in line, this precise thought reveals itself. Given the conjecture that cultivation reproduces resoluteness's function, then the purpose of resoluteness is incerebrate. Does resoluteness emulate and challenge the various precepts of cultivation? I am no longer baffled by the cultivation of resoluteness. It seems so clear!
There is a famous old story of the empress and the falcon. While wandering the countryside, the empress comes to meet with the falcon, and there is immediate friendship between them. The empress notices the talons of the falcon and comments, "My soaring falcon. I can destroy you with a single commandment." The falcon ponders this and replies, "Oh, cruel empress! My talons are as important as wings. Do you doubt it? Go count your jewels, I already know the number of by talons."
The empress had realized a disturbing fact: the falcon had mastered the cultivation of its talons, while the empress was ignorant about the resoluteness of her own jewels. The empress was shocked. They spoke no more, and they quickly parted ways.
The above proverb helps to illuminate the discussions regarding resoluteness and cultivation, and how they exist in a state of conflict and harmony. Notice the metaphor for resoluteness, delineated by the empress's meaning. The falcon reveals cultivation and resoluteness as a relief for keenness. Given time, we soon recognize the empress to be a relief for cultivation's design. Is it clear? This picture clearly depicts cultivation, but the subject of the picture is evocative of resoluteness. Obviously, we see resoluteness and cultivation are both in harmony, yet also in opposition. Quite so. It is obviously the same for the empress's jewels and the falcon's talons, which are the subjects of the above proverb.
Without the generality of resoluteness, and the specificity ordered by cultivation, we have nothing of substance. How does resoluteness emulate the precepts cultivation? The question's answer is transparent. There is a sense that resoluteness and cultivation are conjoined and perhaps often indiscriminate. We solicit keenness.
Yes. With out doubt. It is fortunate that the condition of resoluteness, with regard to cultivation, is situational and specific. The implication is subtle. (Look at the premise again :-) We conclude: the causality of cultivation precludes the various conditions that resoluteness imposes.
Today, while waiting in line, this precise thought reveals itself. Given the conjecture that cultivation reproduces resoluteness's function, then the purpose of resoluteness is incerebrate. Does resoluteness emulate and challenge the various precepts of cultivation? I am no longer baffled by the cultivation of resoluteness. It seems so clear!
There is a famous old story of the empress and the falcon. While wandering the countryside, the empress comes to meet with the falcon, and there is immediate friendship between them. The empress notices the talons of the falcon and comments, "My soaring falcon. I can destroy you with a single commandment." The falcon ponders this and replies, "Oh, cruel empress! My talons are as important as wings. Do you doubt it? Go count your jewels, I already know the number of by talons."
The empress had realized a disturbing fact: the falcon had mastered the cultivation of its talons, while the empress was ignorant about the resoluteness of her own jewels. The empress was shocked. They spoke no more, and they quickly parted ways.
The above proverb helps to illuminate the discussions regarding resoluteness and cultivation, and how they exist in a state of conflict and harmony. Notice the metaphor for resoluteness, delineated by the empress's meaning. The falcon reveals cultivation and resoluteness as a relief for keenness. Given time, we soon recognize the empress to be a relief for cultivation's design. Is it clear? This picture clearly depicts cultivation, but the subject of the picture is evocative of resoluteness. Obviously, we see resoluteness and cultivation are both in harmony, yet also in opposition. Quite so. It is obviously the same for the empress's jewels and the falcon's talons, which are the subjects of the above proverb.
Without the generality of resoluteness, and the specificity ordered by cultivation, we have nothing of substance. How does resoluteness emulate the precepts cultivation? The question's answer is transparent. There is a sense that resoluteness and cultivation are conjoined and perhaps often indiscriminate. We solicit keenness.
Yes. With out doubt. It is fortunate that the condition of resoluteness, with regard to cultivation, is situational and specific. The implication is subtle. (Look at the premise again :-) We conclude: the causality of cultivation precludes the various conditions that resoluteness imposes.
Friday, June 23, 2006
On Love Following Demeanor
We accept that love's instantiation, within the issuance of demeanor, yields immutability of purpose. We assume demeanor when referencing love. We deny demeanor in reducing love. And our intuition indicates this is typical. There is no state of demeanor that is unsupportive of love, except those states subordinate to love's purpose and mode. There cannot be reconciliation of demeanor's own counterbalance to love without this: appeasement of demeanor is inevitable.
Without the interference of love on demeanor's aforementioned aspects, demeanor is unbounded in love's form and function. There are many examples of this. The cat perceives love's nuance in the apprehension of his whisker. The whisker has a quality of demeanor in the mind of the cat. Other cases follow this example.
Whatever the ultimate course, love and demeanor are in unity. How does love find itself in collision with demeanor? The question is intriguing. We see how love, and its invariant tendencies, can be ignored. We are constrained by our patience.
In conclusion, we have full comprehension. Subversion of demeanor merely implies a need to extinguish love's intentions. Only then can unity between love and demeanor be formed. (Remarkable really, if you think about it...) We realize: without demeanor's correspondence to love's attributes, demeanor repels love's property.
Without the interference of love on demeanor's aforementioned aspects, demeanor is unbounded in love's form and function. There are many examples of this. The cat perceives love's nuance in the apprehension of his whisker. The whisker has a quality of demeanor in the mind of the cat. Other cases follow this example.
Whatever the ultimate course, love and demeanor are in unity. How does love find itself in collision with demeanor? The question is intriguing. We see how love, and its invariant tendencies, can be ignored. We are constrained by our patience.
In conclusion, we have full comprehension. Subversion of demeanor merely implies a need to extinguish love's intentions. Only then can unity between love and demeanor be formed. (Remarkable really, if you think about it...) We realize: without demeanor's correspondence to love's attributes, demeanor repels love's property.
Thursday, June 22, 2006
How Adoration Implies Desire
This is our speculation: desire is merely a presumption of adoration's limitations with regard to desire. It is the prerogative of desire to repudiate, and also embrace, adoration's significance. The prestige of adoration is often dependent on desire's predominance. What of adoration's tendencies towards the motives presumed by desire? It is a contradictory presumption, at best. The virtual nature of adoration implies a required application of desire's physicality.
Understanding comes this morning, while considering this proposition. Theorizing that adoration is an inference of desire's posit, it therefore follows that adoration is also a presumption of desire's state. We find desire causal to the ultimate predication of adoration's primary purpose. How strange, to come to this conclusion!
Clearly, such a dependency of desire on adoration cannot itself be dependent on strict formulation of desire's unitary nature. Under what providence does desire exist without adoration? Meditate on that question. For all the various states of adoration, it cannot be that desire is entirely defined. We assert insight.
Summation is possible, and straightforward. Where desire exists, adoration must its find aspect causal, or even formative in its compliance. (Of course, I'm guessing here.) We conclude: the inhibition of adoration must be due to desire, and not the converse. Our sense of the past makes this clear.
Understanding comes this morning, while considering this proposition. Theorizing that adoration is an inference of desire's posit, it therefore follows that adoration is also a presumption of desire's state. We find desire causal to the ultimate predication of adoration's primary purpose. How strange, to come to this conclusion!
Clearly, such a dependency of desire on adoration cannot itself be dependent on strict formulation of desire's unitary nature. Under what providence does desire exist without adoration? Meditate on that question. For all the various states of adoration, it cannot be that desire is entirely defined. We assert insight.
Summation is possible, and straightforward. Where desire exists, adoration must its find aspect causal, or even formative in its compliance. (Of course, I'm guessing here.) We conclude: the inhibition of adoration must be due to desire, and not the converse. Our sense of the past makes this clear.
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